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Abstract
In certain respects, it seems expedient to describe a government
as a homogeneous and self-interested entity, called ’Leviathan’. To
optimize fiscal constraints, we need to know how powerful a Leviathan
really is. This paper presents a new approach to measure the power of
Leviathans. This new approach defines fiscal power in terms of income
deviation. It supposes that there exists a positive connection between
fiscal power and intergovernmental grants. To examine the approach
empirically, we use data on U.S. counties in the period 1999-2002.
Equations of fiscal power are estimated on the full and on stratified
samples. Overall, the results support the new approach. Nonetheless,
further research on the highly significant control variables would be
needed to derive recommendations for more efficient fiscal constraints.
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1 Introduction
In a free society, markets are generally preferred to coordinate economic plans
because they base on voluntary action. Under various conditions, however,
markets do not seem to work properly. Then, external intervention could
improve economic outcomes. The government may be permitted to use force
to change the conditions. In a free society, such a permission can be given by
unanimous agreement. Each member generally agrees to the governmental
force as it promises to lead to Pareto superior outcomes. The government
may become established (by the constitution) as a monopolist on the legiti-
mate use of physical force.
But when more exactly can we expect the government to improve eco-
nomic outcomes? - The answers crucially depend on how we characterize the
government: There are two basic categories: First, self-interested or benevo-
lent: In the neoclassical paradigma, each individual is considered as a ’homo
economicus’; which means, as rational and self-interested. She tries to op-
timize her own utility, profit, or analogous objective value. However, one
could exclude the government from this perspective. Then, the government
appears as a ’deus ex machina’; that is benevolent and optimizes the benefit
of the others as a whole. Second, homogeneous or heterogeneous: The gov-
ernment can be composed of members from different groups, as for instance:
political parties, parliaments, bureaucracies, or interest groups. The mem-
bers thus may have different capacities and objectives. The extent to which
we shall characterize the whole government by these differences depends on
three major questions: Which type of relationship are we interested in: in-
ternal or external? Which functions are we interested in? Which degree of
complexity are we willing to accept?
In a constitutional approach, we typically characterize the government
as a homogeneous and self-interested entity. Such an entity is called ’Le-
viathan’1 The use of this characterization can be justified by at least four
reasons: First, it is rather simple. It reduces some complexity and thus en-
larges the scope for the analysis of the government’s external relationships.
Second, it is rather consistent. Like households or firms, a Leviathan behaves
as a ’homo economicus’. This type does not stand in conflict to the neoclassi-
cal paradigma. Third, it is rather risk-averse. A constitution is not supposed
to be based on any risky assumptions. Predictions on a Leviathan’s actions
tend to be pessimistic. Fourth, it is long-term oriented. For a long-term
evolutionary process, we can find many plausible conditions under which a
Leviathan will reach higher payoffs than other types of government.
Since a Leviathan is self-interested, he might tend to misuse his physical
force. Thus, the question arises: How can Leviathan’s power be constrained
such that his self-interest conforms to the general interest? - We distinguish
two basic modes in which a government can be constrained, namely ’voice’
and ’exit’. Some specification of these modes may be stipulated in the con-
stitution. By voice, citizens seek to change political rules. They take some
direct influence on the political decision-making process. By exit, citizens
1The term ’Leviathan’ is originally used in the Old Testament. Here, it describes a sea
monster. Subsequently, the use of this term has often been modified. Thomas Hobbes, in
particular, describes ’Leviathan’ as an almighty state.
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seek to avoid the consequences of political rules. They have the (legal) option
to leave the respective rule’s domain. - Hence, the degree to which a Levi-
athan can misuse his power depends on the effectiveness of these two modes.
However, the two come at specific costs. These costs enter the cost-benefit
analysis of governmental intervention. Therefore, we shall be interested in
how powerful a Leviathan really is.
In section 2, we look at three approaches to measure the power of Levi-
athans. The first approach suggests that fiscal power can be constrained by
fiscal competition. The degree of competition mainly depends on the federal
structure. We present some specific aspects of this approach and make a
general assessement. The second approach suggests that fiscal power can get
apparent on the labor market. On this market, Leviathans and private firms
compete for input services. A competitor is able to pay extra rents, only if
he or she has extra power. Like before, we present some specific aspects and
make a general assessment. The third approach is original to this article. It
conceives fiscal power as deviation of a Leviathans’s personal income from
the average income in his jurisdiction. This deviation of incomes mainly
depends on the sources of fiscal revenue; which may serve as constraints.
Thus, we are going to empirically examine this approach. In section 3, we
describe our data set. It encompasses more than 3000 U.S. counties in the
period 1999-2002. In section 4, we describe, by our data, the specific political
background. We especially deal with the income levels and the sources of
fiscal revenue. In section 5, we analyze the relationships between the income
deviations and the sources of fiscal revenue. The analysis bases on: corre-
lations, OLS estimations, and sample stratifications. In section 6, we make
conclusions from the above results.
2 Approaches to Measure the Power of Levi-
athans
We define ’power’ as the ability of one party to impose its choice on another
party. In a complex social context, a certain ability tends to become complex,
too. Thus, a Leviathan may find various ways to increase his power. One
central condition for his power is information asymmetry. Such asymmetry
may become especially large in a political context. In general, citizens face
little incentives to invest in political information. For them, the cost-benefit
relation of political action tends to be high. It becomes rational to remain
ignorant. A Leviathan profits from the ’rational ignorance’ of his citizens.
He increases his power by hidden action. Potential constraints on his power
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remain actually weak.
Hence, we seek to measure an abstract concept in a complex context.
Next, we will look at how this challenge is faced by three distinct approaches.
Each of them bases on a central hypothesis.
2.1 The Decentralization Hypothesis
In a federal system, a common constitution stipulates rules on the relation-
ships between the included governments. There are two principle ways in
which two governments can be related: horizontally or vertically. In a hori-
zontal relationship, the two governments have reciprocal rights. These rights
shall raise the gains from interaction. In a vertical relationship, one govern-
ment has the right to dominate the other. Such a right shall help to overcome
coordination problems to the interest of the whole federal system. Thus, a
federal system defines the general scopes of the included governments. It
determines their potential power.
Typically, the most extensive source of a government’s power is its tax
force. Taxes are coercive contributions to the government without a claim on
any specific return. Basically, a government could impose a tax on any valu-
able object inside its territory. However, the two basic modes of constraints
may also apply, here: By voice, citizens claim changes of the given tax sys-
tem. Typical means for such claims are: referenda, legal actions, petitions, or
demonstrations. By exit, citizens move tax objects outside the government’s
territory. Such moves can imply: migration, substitution, commuting, or
fraud. The effectiveness of each of these constraints depends on the federal
system.
Brennan and Buchanan (1980) asked to what degree migration could
serve as a substitute for voice-constraints. This question refers to a seminal
approach by Tiebout (1956). Tiebout suggested that migration induces a
superior mechanism for the provision of (local) public goods. In his appraoch,
he conceives the governments as ’city managers’. Each city manager seeks
to maximize his profits by offering a specific package of public goods. The
citizens in the whole economy have heterogeneous preferences. Each of them
can choose the package that best fits her preferences by migrating to the
respective jursidiction. Hence, competition between the city managers arises.
In order to persist, a city manager needs to minimize his specific costs per
resident. Depending on the actual numbers of residents, he promotes entry
or exit. When the optimal number is reached, he releases his package; every
resident is charged the same contribution. In the whole economy’s long-term
equilibrium, the provision of public goods will be Pareto efficient.
Thus, migration takes up two important functions: First, it incurs some
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revelation of the citizens’ preferences for public goods. Second, it urges
the governments to adapt their policies to the citizens’ preferences. - How-
ever, Brennan and Buchanan stressed that the conditions under which these
functions are operated might tend to be imperfect, even in theory. They
considered four major sources of imperfection:
1. the costs of mobility;
2. the potentiality for collusion;
3. spillovers;
4. economies of scale in administration.
Each of these sources is influenced by the federal system: its horizontal and
its vertical structure. The total influence of one structural feature might be
diverse. Nonetheless, Brennan and Buchanan found some reasoning to set
up the following hypothesis; which we will call ’BBLD’ (Brennan Buchanan
Leviathan Decentralization): A Leviathan will reach the less (fiscal) power,
the higher the degree of competition among governments is; the degree of
competition will be the higher, the more homogeneous are the jurisdictions,
the more jurisdictions are involved, and the more decentralized are the re-
sponsabilities.2 - Based on this hypothesis, several other economists sought
to measure the ’real’ power of Leviathans.
A path-breaking study in this field was made by Oates (1985). He exam-
ined the relationship between government size and the public sector’s degree
of decentralization. One of his two samples contained the 48 contiguous
states in the U.S.A. Working with this sample, Oates specified the govern-
ment size by the aggregate state-local tax receipts in each state as a fraction
of the aggregate personal income. As indicators for the public sector’s degree
of (de-)centralization, he took the state share of the state-local general rev-
enues, the state share of the state-local total expenditure, and the number
of government units in the state sector. A correlation analysis showed that
each of these indicators was only weakly related to the government size vari-
able. Oates included the following four control variables into his regression
analysis: percentage of urban residents in each state, total population size of
the state, state personal income per capita, and intergovernmental grants as
a percentage of the state-local general revenue. - The regressions generated a
negative coefficient for each centralization variable. But, the coefficients were
2See Brennan and Buchanan (1980). In the related literature, we usually find the
denotation ’Leviathan hypothesis’. But, this suggests that the respective hypothesis offers
the only possible way to measure a Leviathan’s power.
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not significantly different from zero. Hence, the BBLD hypothesis cannot not
be confirmed by the results.3
Thereafter, Oates’ approach was intensely discussed; various modifica-
tions were suggested: In an early stage of the discussion, Nelson (1986)
reminded that the BBLD hypothesis could implicate some constraints other
than decentralization. Two major examples are: constitutional rules on the
public revenue bases, and constitutional rules on the public budget struc-
ture. Hence, he included some dummy variables on constitutional rules into
his regressions.
A little later, Nelson (1987) argued that Oates had not developed a suf-
ficient concept of government structures and responsabilities. The horizon-
tal dimension needs to be clearly distinguished from the vertical dimension.
Thus, in an empirical study on the government structure of the U.S.A., it
gets crucial to separate the general- from the single-purpose jurisdictions.
Eberts and Gronberg (1988) emphasized that the effectiveness of migra-
tion as a constraint depends on its specific costs. They supposed that mi-
gration costs sharply rise from one government level to the next higher level.
Consequently, they suggested to test the BBLD hypothesis on the lowest
possible government level.
Marlow (1988), however, argued that it is inexpedient to measure a gov-
ernment’s power in isolation. In a federal system, power can be delegated
from one level to another. What the citizens care about is the total govern-
ment intrusion. Marlow thus looked at the aggregate government expenditure
as a share of the GNP from a time series perspective.
Zax (1989) pointed out another reason why the horizontal and the ver-
tical dimension of the federal structure should be analyzed separately. The
reason is that the two dimensions are likely to have different impacts on scale
economies. Furthermore, these impacts might be nonlinear.
As Forbes and Zampelli (1989) remarked, governments of the same level
need not necessarily stand in competition to each other. They may, for
example, offer different kinds of public goods; which creates different markets.
The respective market structure could also have an impact on the wages of
public employees. These wages are contained in the government size. Hence,
this relationship should be considered in the regression analysis.
In a later stage of the discussion, Joulfaian and Marlow (1990) looked
more closely at the impact of intergovernmental grants. They pointed out
that this impact depends on the whole system of grants, which tends to
3In the same article, Oates uses another sample, with 43 countries around the world.
Again, no evidence is found in favor of a negative relationship between government size
and the public sector’s degree of decentralization.
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be complex. Consequently, the regression analysis should contain the whole
federal system. Otherwise, one would have to assume that all governments
encounter similar constraints.4
Let us sum up: The discussion mainly dealt with the empirical relation-
ship between ’fiscal power’ and ’fiscal decentralization’. Strong controversies
arose about the role of: further (constitutional) constraints; the dimensions
of the federal structure; the delimitation of the relevant market; migration
costs; governmental grants; and the sample choice. Hence, the related studies
differ rather strongly in their results. In the course of the discussion, evi-
dence in favor of the BBLD hypothesis might have become a little stronger.
Nevertheless, it still seems very difficult to make reliable assessments of a
Leviathan’s power. The BBLD approach still has too many shortcomings;
especially with respect to the specification of the two key terms: ’fiscal power’
and ’fiscal decentralization’.5
In the related studies, fiscal power is normally specified as a fiscal budget
variable in relation to a social-economic value. Major instances for such a
fiscal budget variable are: tax revenue, fiscal own-source revenue, or public
expenditure. Major instances for a chosen social-economic value are: popu-
lation size, total personal income, or gross domestic product. - The key prob-
lem with all of these possible specifications is that they do not distinguish
between the different representatives of fiscal power. In a federal system,
governments of different levels can be such representatives. Furthermore,
fiscal power may be kept by the citizens via the democratic order. Power is
not a question of who adminstrates but of who chooses. Power implies that
one party is able to impose its choice on another party. What we seek to find
out is who really dominates and to what degree. For this, we need a different
method to specify fiscal power, a different explained variable.
In the related studies, fiscal decentralization is normally specified as: a)
the share of the lower level governments’ revenue in the total public revenue;
b) the share of the lower level governments’ expenditure in the total pub-
lic expenditure; c) the number of government units on the lower level (per
resident). The specifications a) and b) refer to a federal structure’s vertical
dimension; c) to the horizontal dimension. But, each of these specifications
rather describes the given administration structure than actual responsabil-
ity. The administration structure does not need to reflect real economic
decision-making. The degree of fiscal competition may hardly depend on
this structure. The different dimensions tend to interact. This makes it dif-
4A different approach to analyze the impact of intergovernmental grants is chosen by
Grossman (1989a, 1989b, 1992).
5A more favorable recapitulation of the discussion is given by Oates (1989).
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ficult to assess the impact of any difference. Therefore, what we need is a
different method to specify fiscal decentralization, some different explaining
variables.
2.2 The Partial Labor Market Hypothesis
We may assume that a Leviathan uses his power to maximize his personal
income. He seeks to generate and usurp extra rents on the labor market.
The ’human capital theory’ may help to explain how such extra rents can
be generated: In this theory, different investments in human capital lead to
a diversification of labor and thus to a fragmentation of the labor market.
There exist two forms of human capital: ’general’ and ’specific’. The general
human capital is demanded on the whole labor market. The specific human
capital, however, is demanded only on a partial labor market. Typically, the
latter form is generated via ’on-the-job-training’. Depending on the amount
and composition of human capital, the following phenomena may occur:6
• Labor market participants invest in signaling.
• Labor suppliers and labor demanders share the cost of human capital.
• Labor demanders pay wages above the productivity level.
• Labor demanders discriminate.
• There is unemployment.
• Partial labor markets vary in structures and institutions.
A Leviathan is supposed to intervene where free market coordination
fails. He thus acts as a monopolist on certain product markets. His activity
on these product markets induces some specific human capital. Based on
this, he becomes a monopsonist on some partial labor market. A Leviathan
can (mis-)use his monopsony position in various ways to generate and usurp
extra rents. Let us look at some major instances: A Leviathan does not
encounter a profit constraint. Instead, the citizens may set political con-
straints. However, these tend to be more difficult to control. In the political
decision-making process, a Leviathan may occupy central positions. First
of all, he works out the proposals, especially the budget proposals. He can
bring them into a ’take it or leave it’ form. Furthermore, Leviathan reaches
advantages in knowledge. He can gather, transform and select politically
6The foundations of the modern ’human capital theory’ were laid by Becker (1975).
An introduction to this theory is given by Ehrenberg and Smith (2009), ch. 9.
8
relevant information, at lower costs. And finally, Leviathan sets the agenda.
Via the agenda, he can influence the results of the political votes.7
Altogether, a Leviathan uses his specific human capital and his central
position in the political decision-making process to generate and usurp extra
rents on the labor market. The relevant partial labor market is characterized
by: a more rigorous regulation; more powerful unions; longer contract terms;
waiting lines; signaling of political attitude; discrimination; and so forth. We
may set up the following hypothesis and call it ’LPLM’ (Leviathan Partial
Labor Market): The more diversified and fractionized the labor market is,
the more power a Leviathan will reach.
There has been an extensive discussion on the wage differentials between
the public and the private sector. The discussion is motivated by the question
which payment of public sector employees can be regarded as just. The
degree of justice is assessed with regard to the payment of private sector
employees. It is supposed that the human capital theory allows to compare
unequal profiles in the two sectors. One seeks to measure the economic
rent or premium which remains after the deduction of the differences in the
required job profiles. Some instances of such differences are: the specific
human capital; the mobility; the wage volatility; the job loss risk; non-wage
compensation; working conditions; or superior goals.
Hence, we may encounter a large number of empirical studies on public-
private sector wage differentials. Within the last few years, two methodolog-
ical approaches have become conventional: firstly, sample stratification in
order to examine the wage distributions; secondly, wage differential decom-
positions in order to distinguish between the job profile components and the
extra rent components. Some of the major findings are as follows:
Bender (2003) examined data on six British local labor markets from 1986.
He showed that the differences in the wage distributions between the private
and the public sector were much more important than the differences in the
wage averages. For instance, male employees received a positive premium at
the lower part and a negative premium at the higher part of the public sector
wage distribution.
Disney and Gosling (2003) worked with data on a British privatization
program in the 1990s. These data were regared as suitable to avoid self-
selection and measurement bias. As the two authors found out, women
earned on average more in the public sector than they could in the private
sector. But, no clear tendency appeared for college-educated women.
Belman and Heywood (2004) asked to what degree public-private sector
wage differentials were caused by the respective job profiles. In their empirical
7For an overview of the respective public choice models, see Mueller (2003).
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study on the U.S.A. in 1997 and in 1999, they found out that a detailed
controlling for job profiles: a) modestly reduces the federal differential, b)
very modestly increases the state differential, and c) substantially increases
the local differential.
Melly (2005) claimed that estimations on wage diffentials be interpreted
conditional on the selected sample. He selected samples from the ’German
Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP)’ for the period 1984 to 2001. It turned out
that women reached positive premia in the public sector, while men reached
negative ones. In addition, job experience induces higher payoffs in the public
sector. All results were stable over the whole period.
Elliott et al. (2005) focused on institutional effects on wage differentials.
They analyzed differentials before and after a public sector devolution and
pay reform in the UK. As they found out, the public-private sector wage dif-
ferentials became smaller in both England and Scotland. However, two other
factors can be made responsable for this decrease: firstly, the introduction of
a minimum wage rule in the private sector; and secondly, an upswing of the
overall economic activity.
Altogether, the related studies find significance for several determinants of
public-private sector wage differentials. The significance appears as especially
high for the gender and for the wage level. However, it remains difficult
to interpret the results in terms of governmental power. First of all, the
labor markets appear as highly diverse. A good estimation thus demands to
integrate a broad variety of control variables. Many of these variables are not
available or merely in a qualitative form. Moreover, the control for diverse
market structures eliminates the impact of internal labor markets. Labor
markets are often characterized by ’barriers of entry’ or ’ports of entry’.
Therefore, internal structures could be more important for the determination
of wages than external structures. And finally, the wages on the private
labor markets may appear as a bad yardstick. On these markets, there also
can arise distortions which are not (directly) related to governmental power.
Thus, if women earn - ceteris paribus - more on a public than on a private
labor market: How can we say where they are actually discriminated? And
who got the power to discriminate? - Altogether, the related literature leaves
the LPLM hypothesis widely open.8
2.3 The Average Income Hypothesis
We may justify the income of a Leviathan by his performance in generating
Pareto superior outcomes. He may claim a share of the gain that arises
8For a survey of the earlier discussion, see Bender (1998).
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from his support of Pareto superior cooperation. But here, we encounter two
major questions: How can this gain be measured? And what would be a ’fair’
share? - Basically, the gains from cooperation can be described in terms of
welfare. But, it seems impossible to measure welfare, itself. There has been
an extensive discussion about what could be the best indicator for welfare.
Generally, a certain measure of the domestic product is indorsed by most
scholars. Nevertheless, this indicator has at least two important drawbacks:
First, the national product considers only factors which occur on official
markets and are expressed in monetary units. Leisure, household production,
and external effects are not explicitly included. Second, the national product
does not consider the initial endowment in production factors. Hence, it does
not properly help to explore the ultimate sources of welfare.9
In order to assess the fair share of a welfare gain for a Leviathan, citizens
compare his performance with those of other Leviathans. There are two
basic modes in which citizens can express their assessments: voice and exit.
The two modes differ in their costs and their effectiveness. Anyhow, both
depend on how the Leviathan claims his share. In a federal system, there
are two basic modes in which he can claim his share: First, the Leviathan
directly imposes a charge on his considered citizens. He thus receives revenue
from own sources. Second, the Leviathan allows a higher level Leviathan
to impose a charge on the considered citizens. In return, the first receives
revenue from the latter by grants. Now, it seems plausible that the first
’public income mode’ weakens both of the ’constraint modes’ less than the
second. A Leviathan will be able to reach more fiscal power by grants. Thus,
we may set up the following hypothesis and call it ’LADI’ (Leviathan Average
Domestic Income): A Leviathan will reach the more fiscal power (measured
by the deviation of his personal income from the average domestic income),
the higher the relative amount of grants in his total budget is.
3 The Data
To examine the LADI hypothesis, we use data collected by the U.S. Bureau
of the Census. This Census Bureau offers three groups of data sets which
seem to particularly fit our purposes. These are entitled:
1. Census of Government: Public Employment;
2. Census of Government: Government Finances;
9For an overview of the early discussion, see Moss (ed.) (1973); an important contri-
bution of the later discussion was made by Anand and Harris (1994).
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3. Decennial Census: Population and Housing.
In the U.S.A., a ’Census of Government’ has been taken since 1957, at
5-year intervals. Each of these censuses has the following main subjects:
government organization, public employment, and government finances. The
censuses seek to cover all state and all local governments. The latter are
of five different types: county, municipality, township, school district, and
special district. In 2002, there existed 3,141 county regions. Together, they
distinctively spanned the whole territory of the U.S.A. Only very few of
them did not have an own government. The number of county governments
in a given state ranged from 1 to 254. The Census Bureau also assigned
all other local governments to their county regions. There existed: 19,429
municipal governments, 16,504 township governments, 13,506 school district
governments, and 35,052 special district governments.
The ’Compendium of Public Employment: 2002’ presents comprehensive
data sets on government employment and payrolls in each state and county.
Here, the Census Bureau defines government employees as individuals who
regularly perform a public service. In order to make comparisons between em-
ployment levels easier, it caLpulated the ’full-time equivalent employment’.
This term describes the number of full-time employees that would be needed
to accomplish the same total number of hours worked. Furthermore, the Cen-
sus Bureau divided the total number of full-time employment into different
functions, as for instance: education, social services, transportation, public
safety, environment/ housing, government administration, or utilities. The
payroll numbers express gross payments; these include all salaries, wages,
fees, etc. which are paid to the employees in a fixed period. The average
monthly earnings represent the quotient of the full-time employee payroll to
the number of full-time employees.
The ’Compendium of Government Finances: 2002’ offers broad informa-
tion on the state and the local government budgets in the fiscal year 2001-02.
The revenues are defined as actual receipts of a government and its agencies.
The following amounts are thus subtracted from gross inflows: tax refunds to
citizens, receipts from the issuance of debt, the sale of securities, and taxes
collected on behalf of other government units. The Census Bureau divides
public revenue into four distinct classes: intergovernmental revenue, general
revenue from own sources, utility and liquor store revenue, and insurance
trust revenue. - The expenditures are defined as actual payments of a gov-
ernment and its agencies. The Census Bureau divides the public expenditure
by character/ object and by function. By character/ object, it devides into
six classes: intergovernmental expenditure, current operation, capital outlay,
assistance/ subsidies, interest on debt, insurance benefits/ repayments. The
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classes by function are the same as in the public employment case.
In the U.S.A., a ’Decennial Census’ has been carried out since 1790. Since
1975, the Census Bureau is in charge of this. The latest census (for the year
2000) comprises, in particular, 171 population items and 56 housing items as
100-percent data; which are based on general questions to all people about
their personal characteristics and their housing. Additionally, the Census
Bureau took a large sample and asked these people more detailed questions
about the same issues. Altogether, the ’Decennial Census: 2000’ offers an
enormous range of population and housing items; which describe for example:
household structure, sources of income, educational attainment, or housing
status.
Thus, the U.S. Bureau of the Census provides three groups of high quality
data which match especially well with our intentions. It allows us to construct
empirical variables which might highly correspond to our set of theoretical
variables. It brings us into the position to confront the LADI hypothesis
with a rigorous test. Nevertheless, we shall recognize the data’s respective
limitations. Let us briefly mention three points: First, every monetary value
is measured in current US-dollars. Differences among regions or periods are
not taken into consideration. Second, even governments or the same level
may adopt different tasks. In agreement with the citizens or with private
firms, they may contract in or out various functions. Third, the data partially
refer to different periods. For example: Not every government starts its fiscal
year in the same month. Generally, the Decennial Census values lag behind
the Census of Government values by two to three years.
4 Local Policy in the U.S.A.
In our examination of the LADI hypothesis, we shall become more acquainted
with the relevant empirical background by some descriptive statistics. Our
sample encompasses 3105 out of 3141 U.S. counties. In the U.S.A., the
counties have been designed as basic providers of local public goods. In their
history, they have considerably adopted to the socio-economic progress. But
still, we encounter an immense variety of county structures.
Table 1 presents some major features of the county structures: On aver-
age, there live 88662 people in one county. But, the standard deviation of
POPUL1 is enormously high. Especially, there exist 30 counties with a pop-
ulation size greater than 1 million. Around 40% of the people live in urban
areas (POPURBp). These areas are the main destinations of intercounty
migration. 20% of those who lived in a certain county in 2000 had lived in a
different one in 1995 (POP5DH4p). One central aspect of our examination is
13
the degree to which the people constrain the local governments by migration.
On average, 1000 people meet with 56 local public employees (EMPLTLp);
the standard deviation is 22; the distribution is skewed by some outliers to
the right (with a maximum of 448).
variable mean median std. dev. skewn.
POPUL1 88689 25052 291733 16.6
HHTL 32458 9322 101010 14.6
POPURBp 0.3973 0.3934 0.3071 0.19
POP5DH4p 0.20 0.1888 0.0679 1.22
EMPLTL 4060 1251 13691 18.7
EMPLTLp 0.0560 0.0505 0.0223 3.75
Table 1: County structures in the U.S.A.
We assume that all individuals have identical preferences for income.
They behave as income maximizers. Thus, we can use income as a wel-
fare indicator. Table 2 offers some key insights on the income of the people,
the households, and the local public employees. In 1999, the per capita in-
come of the average county was around USD 17483 (PCAPINC). The other
counties deviated from this level by USD 3895. Together, it gives an in-
formation criterion (IC) of 0.22. In the same year, the household median
income over all counties was USD 35320 (HHMDINC); with a standard de-
viation of USD 8851, and an IC of 0.25. In 2002, the average local public
employee in the average county earned around USD 32078 (EARNYFT).
This value deviates by USD 6419 in absolute terms and by 0.20 in relative
terms. Thus, EARNYFT appears as more equally and more symmetrically
distributed than the other two variables. However, we must be careful when
comparing the levels of the three variables, because they incorporate different
components, as in particular: household size and capital income.
variable mean median std. dev. skewn.
PCAPINC 17482.57 16930.0 3894.70 1.58
HHMDINC 35320.09 33759.0 8851.49 1.34
EARNYFT 32078.02 30900.0 6418.56 1.06
Table 2: Income levels of distinctive groups
Table 3 offers some information about the importance of the local public
payrolls. If we assumed that there is strict autonomy, we could interpret the
information as follows: The average county resident paid USD 1369 for his
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county’s public payrolls. Across all counties, the values of PAYRYc varied
considerably. There were thirty counties where the average resident paid
more than USD 3000. In the average county, the public payrolls amounted
to nearly 44% of the public expenditure (PAYRYg). The standard deviation
was nearly 9. - But, we should keep in mind that some shares of the payrolls
are covered by state or federal funds. Hence, the real distribution of the
financial burdens might differ from the picture that is outlined by this table.
variable mean median std. dev. skewn.
PAYRYp 1368.69 1281.52 514.41 4.85
PAYRYg 43.52 43.26 8.97 1.29
Table 3: Relative expenditure for local public payrolls
The LADI hypothesis supposes that the power of a Leviathan can be
measured by his relative personal income. Thus, we set his personal income
in relation to the average income in his county. This can be justified as
follows: The provision of local public goods may be regarded as the basis
of productivity. Hence, local public employees are highly responsable for
the overall income level in their counties. A fixation of the personal to the
overall income is likely to induce a fair yardstick and positive incentives. In
our examination of the LADI hypothesis, we work with two indicators for
political power: OFFPCI and OFFHHMI; where:
• OFFPCI = (EARNYFT - PCAPINC) / PCAPINC;
• OFFHHMI = (EARNYFT - HHMDINC) / HHMDINC.
As table 4 shows, the distribution of OFFPCI is less equal and symmet-
rical than the one of OFFHHM.
variable mean median std. dev. skewn.
OFFPCI 0.8709 0.8378 0.3484 1.70
OFFHHMI -0.0670 -0.0824 0.1763 0.98
Table 4: Relative deviations of local officials’ earnings
Our hypothesis states a certain relationship between fiscal power and the
sources of public revenue. Table 5 comprises relevant information on the
revenues of U.S. counties in 2002. On average, the counties earned a total
revenue of USD 3253 per capita (REVTLp). The highest share of the total
revenue stemed from intergovernmental grants; namely 42% (REVIGVTb).
This share was very equally and symmetrically distributed. Clearly, the main
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grantors were the respective states (REVFSTb). The federal government
just adopted an equalizing role. Taxes amounted to more than 30% of the
total revenue (TAXTLb). The most important type was the property tax
(TAXPRPb). However, its importance varies quite strongly from county
to county. Another bigger source of local fiscal revenue were charges. On
average, they still contributed more than 20% of the total budgets. The main
features of their distribution were quite similar to those of the property tax.
variable mean median std. dev. skewn.
REVTLp 3252.87 2960.15 1630.03 8.32
REVIGVTp 1279.14 1165.42 566.76 2.80
REVIGVTb 0.4199 0.4173 0.1391 0.07
REVFSTb 0.3906 0.3871 0.1322 0.57
TAXTLb 0.3043 0.2888 0.1253 0.98
TAXPRPb 0.2408 0.2246 0.1229 1.27
CHARTLb 0.2014 0.1702 0.1072 1.24
Table 5: Sources of local fiscal revenue
5 Fiscal Power and the Sources of Fiscal Rev-
enue
The LADI hypothesis states that intergovernmental grants positively de-
termine fiscal power. Tables 6 and 7 may at first help us to analyze this
relationship in a simple statistical form. As we can see, each of the cor-
relation coefficients between total intergovernmental grants (REVIGVTp or
REVIGVTb) and fiscal power (OFFHHMI or OFFPCI) is significantly posi-
tive. The coefficients with REVIGVTp are somewhat higher than those with
REVIGVTb. With respect to fiscal power, it seems less important who the
grantor is: the state or the federal government. REVFFED or REVFST
have lower correlations with OFFHHMI or OFFPCI than REVIGVT. Next,
to assess the real importance of intergovernmental grants, we need to con-
sider their relationships with other sources of fiscal revenue. It turns out that
such relationships in per capita terms are in general very weak. But surely,
such in budget share terms must be stronger, since all the shares sum up to
1. In effect, we find the highest coefficient in this context (as an absolute
value) between REVIGVTb and TAXTLb. Thus, TAXTLb even surpasses
REVIGVTb a little in the correlation with OFFHHMI and with OFFPCI.
The impact of fiscal revenue on fiscal power may be influenced by third
variables. In a next step, we look at all available third variables and select
16
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those which are highly correlated with OFFHHMI or with OFFPCI. In our
sample, we have 41 third variables available. They can be assigned to the
following categories: public expenditure, public employment structure, pri-
vate employment structure, demography, and housing. Out of these 41 vari-
ables, we find only 8 with a correlation coefficient greater than 0.3; namely:
HHPASShh, HHSEChh, HHSSIhh, HHWAGEhh, POPNATp, POP5DH4r5,
RENTCTM and RENTGRM. We accept these as potential control variables
in our multiple regressions.
Our regressional analysis shall help to assess intergovernmental grants as a
determinant of fiscal power in combination with other determinants. We base
our analysis on OLS estimations and follow three steps: First, we regress our
dependent variable on all eight potential control variables. We then eliminate
each redundant variable via a redundancy test. Second, we insert each of the
explaining variables (REVIGVTb or REVIGVTp) into the control equation.
Third, we compare our estimating equations via four criteria: adjusted R-
squared, Akaike information criterion, Jarque-Bera test, Ramsey’s RESET
test. - Altogether, the regressional analysis is guided by two questions: To
what degree can fiscal power be explained by this approach? What are the
specific contributions of intergovernmental grants?
Table 8 presents the main results from our full sample regressions of
OFFHHMI. Equation (1) consists of three control variables: HHPASShh,
HHWAGE, and POP5DH4r5. All of them are highly significant and have the
expected signs. Equation (2) integrates REVIGVTb as a regressor, which be-
comes highly significant. Equation (3) integrates REVIGVTp, which become
even more so. There is no change of signs. If we compare the three equations,
we may state the following: Equation (1) clearly reaches the highest explana-
tory power; with an (adjusted) R-squared of 0.431. Hence, REVIGVTp adds
clearly more explanatory power to the control regressors than REVIGVTb.
The AIC, as a meausre of the goodness to fit, conforms to the R-squared
results. The Jarque-Bera values indicate highly nonsymmetric distributions
of the residuals. One can easily show that these values highly depend on
a few outliers of OFFHHMIc. Finally, the RESET test gives no reason to
suspect any misspecification.
Our regressions of OFFPCI bring about similar results (table 9). How-
ever, two differences shall be pointed out: First, POPNATp appears as a
control variable instead of HHWAGEhh. And second, all these three regres-
sions reach less explanatory power.
Each of our dependent variables is constructed out of two components.
Now, we may ask how the functional relationships depend on each compo-
nent. In a next step, we will use a sample stratification method to clar-
ify the dependency. Our preferred estimating equation is (3) from table
19
(1) (2) (3)
c 0.5293 0.4747 0.4592
(17.8) (14.7) (15.8)
REVIGVTb 0.0829
(4.24)
REVIGVTp 0.0672
(15.2)
HHPASShh 3.3020 3.1303 2.7862
(26.5) (23.9) (22.3)
HHWAGEhh -0.8957 -0.8628 -0.9053
(-22.3) (-21.1) (23.3)
POP5DH4r5 -0.2736 -0.2657 -0.2291
(-7.03) (-6.83) (-6.08)
adj. R-squ. 0.389 0.392 0.431
AIC -1.125 -1.130 -1.196
J.-Bera 6780 6299 9442
RESET 26.7 16.2 15.0
Table 8: Regressions of OFFHHMI: full sample
(1) (2) (3)
c 0.7485 0.6262 0.5698
(35.6) (24.4) (24.7)
REVIGVTb 0.3253
(8.17)
REVIGVTp 0.1476
(16.0)
HHPASShh 7.4920 6.6906 6.6541
(24.6) (21.1) (22.3)
POPNATp 0.5584 0.5805 0.4125
(6.41) (6.73) (4.90)
POP5DH4r5 -0.7245 -0.6603 -0.6181
(-9.23) (-8.46) (-8.16)
R-squ. adj. 0.317 0.331 0.369
AIC 0.349 0.328 0.271
J.-Bera 3469 3330 6528
RESET 26.3 12.4 38.6
Table 9: Regressions of OFFPCI: full sample
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8. To make our results more ’traceable’, we first eliminate some outliers of
OFFHHMI from the sample. Then, we stratify the sample by HHMINC and
by EARNYFT into quartiles. We thus get two times four subsamples; each
with 775 or 776 objects. Finally, our preferred function is estimated on each
of the eight subsamples. - The results look as follows:
With the stratification by HHMINC (table 10), our (main) explaining
variable (REVIGVTp) gets clearly significant in all four estimating equations.
The t-values are particularly high from the two inner quartiles. Two of the
control variables (HHPASShh and HHWAGEhh) also get clearly significant
in all equations. They are more so in (1) and (4). But the third control
variable (POP5DH4r5) is just significant in (3) and (4). The constant (c)
is just significant in (1) and (4). Nevertheless, each significant coefficient
in this table has its expected sign. Except for equation (4), the explanatory
power (the adjusted R-squared) is rather low. The AIC values do not strictly
correspond to the adjusted R-squared values. Based on the Jarque-Bera test,
all four equations show nonsymmetric distributions of their residuals. The
RESET does not clearly indicate misspecification, at least not on a 10%-level.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
c 0.2689 -0.0066 -0.0354 0.5232
(3.77) (-0.10) (-0.47) (7.74)
REVIGVTp 0.0428 0.0718 0.0967 0.0652
(4.10) (9.84) (11.89) (8.78)
HHPASShh 2.3952 1.6898 2.3778 2.2514
(11.1) (6.85) (7.16) (8.24)
HHWAGEhh -0.5318 -0.2906 -0.2836 -0.9179
(-5.12) (-2.98) (-2.79) (-10.4)
POP5DH4r5 -0.1296 0.0234 -0.1984 -0.4870
(-1.48) (0.34) (-3.09) (-8.09)
adj. R-squ. 0.222 0.182 0.298 0.442
AIC -0.990 -1.440 -1.479 -1.614
J.-Bera 89.2 68.2 157 83.9
RESET 8.91 3.52 11.8 24.0
Table 10: Regressions of OFFHHMI: adjusted sample, stratified by HHMINC
With the stratification by EARNYFT (table 11), REVIGVTp gets signif-
icant in all four estimating equations, at least on a 10%-level. The t-values
rise with the level of EARNYFT. HHPASShh and HHWAGEhh reach enor-
mously high t-values, all over. In contrast, the regression coefficients of
POP5DH4r5 in the third and fourth quartile are insignificant. In all these
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estimations, each significant coefficient gets its expected sign. The stratifica-
tion by EARNYFT leads to higher explanatory power. The four equations
reach R-squared values between 59% and 65%. The AIC indicates a bet-
ter fit of those two equations where none of the coefficients is insignificant.
Although the fit appears as being high, the Jarque-Bera values indicate non-
symmetrically distributed residuals. Based on the RESET, misspecification
seems the most likely for equation (1). Still, it reaches a significance level of
10%.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
c 0.6297 0.850 0.9131 1.1956
(12.2) (17.9) (17.7) (22.0)
REVIGVTp 0.0167 0.0217 0.0293 0.0318
(1.90) (2.87) (4.15) (4.72)
HHPASShh 3.2172 3.8354 2.9881 3.0470
(19.2) (18.6) (15.7) (12.9)
HHWAGEhh -1.1207 -1.4826 -1.4934 -1.7452
(-16.2) (-22.5) (-22.1) (-25.4)
POP5DH4r5 -0.5960 -0.1159 0.0102 -0.0521
(-9.26) (-2.13) (0.18) (-0.84)
adj. R-squ. 0.615 0.644 0.591 0.629
AIC -1.780 -1.869 -1.727 -1.454
J.-Bera 153 138 396 268
RESET 2.89 4.94 33.0 12.3
Table 11: Regressions of OFFHHMI: adjusted sample, stratified by
EARNYFT
6 Summary and Evaluations
We tried to measure the power of Leviathans via the LADI hypothesis. We
took a sample of 3105 U.S. counties from the period 1999-2002. We described
relevant features of local policy in the U.S.A. In particular, the description
provided insights into the distributions of incomes in the public and the
private sector. We looked at how fiscal power is correlated. It turned out
to be more highly correlated with intergovernmental grants than with any
other source of local public revenue. We ran regressions of fiscal power with
the full sample. Our best estimation consisted of: the relative deviation of
the local officials’ earnings from the household median income (as explained
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variable); the total intergovernmental revenue per capita (as explaining vari-
able); the share of households with public assistance income, the share of
households with wage or salary income, and the share of residents who were
5 years or older who had lived in a different county 5 years before (as control
variables). Finally, we stratified the sample by the two components of the
explained variable; we estimated our best equation with each of the quartiles.
The stratification by the local officials’ earnings enormously raised the ex-
planatory power, whereas the stratification by the household median income
lowered it in three quartiles. However, the significances of the intergovern-
mental revenue per capita and of the share of residents who had moved were
partly reduced by both stratification types.
Overall, our empirical analysis provides support to the LADI hypothesis.
In 2002, U.S. local officials had the more fiscal power, the higher the relative
amount of intergovernmental grants in their total budgets was. Nevertheless,
we shall point out some limitations of this overall result: First, the two
explained variables do not correctly assign income deviation to fiscal power.
This is because the per capita income as well as the household median income
may include components which stem from outside the county; capital income
in particular. It seems hardly justified to make the local officials responsable
for such components. Second, the deviation from the household median
income appears as a stronger indicator for fiscal power than the deviation
from the per capita income. One reason can be that the first variable is more
symmetrically distributed. Another reason can be that it has some spurious
correlations with the other household variables in the estimating equations.
Third, the stratification by the local officials’ earnings induces a much higher
explanatory power than the stratification by the household median income.
This also suggests that local officials’ earnings are much less flexible than
private sector earnings. Fourth, total intergovernmental grants in per capita
terms appear as a stronger explaining variable than in terms of budget share.
Thus, fiscal power seems to be less dependent on a Leviathan’s capacity to
switch between different sources of local public revenue. Fifth, the estimating
equations include just one variable which can clearly be assigned to ’voice’
or ’exit’, namely the share of residents who had lived in a different county 5
years before. This control variable gets insignificant in some of the quartile
estimations. Hence, there is little information about the effectiveness of voice
or exit as constraints. And sixth, the highest impact on fiscal power seems
to come from the sources of private (!) income, especially public assistance,
wage and salary. Still, there is little theory in the background to explain
why.
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Appendix
List of Empirical Variables
CHARTL local government budgets: total charges
EARN3FT public employment: all average March earnings,
full-time employees
EARNYFT EARN3FT * 12
EARNIO public employment: average March earnings, in-
structional employees only
EPLFADM population: public employees, financial and other
government administration only
EPLFIRE population: public employees, fire protection only
EPLHLTH population: public employees, health and hospitals
only
EPLISTR population: public employees, instruction only
EPLFT population: public employees, full time
EPLFTE population: public employees, full-time equivalent
EPLTL population: public employees
EDTCAP local government budgets: capital outlay
EDTEDUC local government budgets: expenditure: education
EDTGEN local government budgets: general direct expendi-
ture
EDTHLTH local government budgets: expenditure: health
EDTIGVT local government budgets: intergovernmental ex-
penditure
EDTTL local government budgets: total direct expenditure
FAMMINC median family income in 1999
HHINTER households: with interest, dividends or net rental
income
HHMINC median household income
HHPASS households: with public assistance income
HHRETI households: with retirement income
HHSEC households: with social security income
HHSEMPL households: with self-employment income
HHSSI households: with supplemental security income
HHTL total number of households
HWAGE households: with wage or salary income
HSUNIT number of housing units
HSVAC vacant housing units
OFFFAMMI (EARNYFT - FAMMINC) / FAMMINC
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OFFHHMI (EARNYFT - HHMDINC) / HHMDINC
OFFPCI (EARNYFT - PCAPINC) / PCAPINC
PAYINSTR public employment: average March payrolls, full-
time employees, instructional employees only
PAYR3TL public employment: total March payrolls, full-time
employees
PAYRYED PAYR3TL * 12 / EXPDTL;
PAYRYPC PAYR3TL * 12 / POPUL1;
PCAPINC per capita income in 1999
POP5DH population: 5 years and over: different house in
1995
POP5DH4 population: 5 years and over: different house in
1995, in United States, different county
POPAS population: Asian alone
POPNAT population: American Indian and Alaska Native
alone
POPRUR population: percentage: rural
POPUL1 total population size
POPUL5 population size: 5 years and over in county
POPURB population: urban
POPURB2 population: inside urbanized areas
POPWH population: white alone
RENTCTM median contract rent
RENTGRM median gross rent
REVFFED local government budgets: revenue from federal
government
REVFST local government budgets: revenue from state
REVGEN local government budgets: total general revenue
REVIGVT local government budgets: total intergovernmental
revenue
REVOSC local government budgets: total general revenue:
from own sources
REVTL local government budgets: total revenue
TAXPRP local government budgets: revenue: from property
taxes
TAXTL local government budgets: revenue: from total
taxes
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Abbreviations
b budget share
ed per total public expenditure
hh per households
hs per housing units
p per capita
r5 resident: 5 years and older
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